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 DEALING WITH CHALLENGES TO METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM: THE 
PARADIGM PROBLEM, PSYCHOLOGICAL RESISTANCE AND CULTURAL 
BARRIERS 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper calls for methodological pluralism in industrial marketing research. We 
discuss three challenges that proponents of methodological pluralism have to address if 
their practice is to be seen as credible: the paradigm problem; psychological resistance; 
and lack of cultural readiness to accept pluralism. We review the works of a variety of 
authors from other disciplines who have tackled these problems, and identify useful ideas 
to take forward into a model of learning. This addresses the paradigm problem by making 
it clear that no pluralist methodology can exist without making its own paradigmatic 
assumptions. It deals with psychological resistance by talking in terms of learning, 
starting from wherever the researcher is currently situated (a large knowledge base is not 
needed to begin practicing methodological pluralism). However, this model does not deal 
with the question of whether the time is right, culturally, for methodological pluralism. 
We argue that the time will be right when it is widely appreciated that methodological 
pluralism adds value to industrial marketing research practice. The next step for our 
research community must be the accumulation of a body of empirical evidence to 
demonstrate that this added value does or does not exist.  
 
Keywords: critical systems thinking; methodological pluralism; mixed methods; 
paradigm incommensurability; multimethodology; industrial marketing methods. 
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1.0: Methodological pluralism in marketing scholarship 
 
There have historically been competing paradigms in marketing research. The dominant 
paradigm has been called ‘functionalist’ (Arndt, 1985; Burton, 2001; Hanson & 
Grimmer, 2007; Hunt, 2002; Tadajewski, 2004, 2008, 2009; Tadajewski & Hewer, 2012), 
but many advocates of ‘interpretivist’ research are also evident (e.g. Belk et al., 1988; 
Brown et al., 1996; Egan, 2009; Gummesson, 2003; Mathyseens & Vandenbempt, 2003). 
It has been argued that research published in leading industrial marketing journals 
demonstrates a better balance between these paradigms than within the marketing 
academy more broadly (Beverland & Lindgreen, 2010; Möller, 2013).  
 
The above paradigmatic research communities make different philosophical, theoretical 
and methodological assumptions, which flow into their views on what kinds of methods 
they consider valid or legitimate. Broadly speaking, functionalists advocate the use of 
quantitative methods focused on observable phenomena, while interpretivists prefer 
qualitative methods that explore meanings from different human perspectives (Hanson & 
Grimmer, 2007). As a reaction against the splitting of the marketing research community 
into these competing camps, a small but growing group of researchers has spoken against 
notions of paradigm incommensurability (the idea that the paradigms are utterly 
irreconcilable) and advocated, in various different ways, the adoption of a pluralist 
approach to marketing scholarship (Anderson, 1986, 1988a, 1988b; Davies & Fitchett, 
2005; Hunt, 1990, 1991; Hunt, 1992; Hunt, 1994; Levy & Kellstadt, 2012; Lewis & 
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Grimes, 1999; LaPlaca & Lindgreen 2016; Lowe et al., 2004; Lowe et al., 2005; Möller, 
2013; Nicholson et al., 2014; Peters et al., 2013; Tadajewski, 2008, 2009; Tadajewski et 
al., 2014; Tadajewski & Hewer, 2012). These approaches to pluralism include the 
proposal of meta-theories that sit above and govern the use of ideas from the different 
paradigms (Hunt, 2013; Möller, 2013; Vargo & Lusch, 2004, 2008); the creation of 
paradigm interplay (Davies & Fitchett, 2005; Lowe et al., 2004; Lowe et al., 2005; Peters 
et al., 2013); and the deployment of integrative theories and frameworks (Nicholson et 
al., 2014), drawing most popularly in industrial marketing on the lenses of critical realism 
(Easton, 2002, 2010; Ehret, 2013; Harrison & Easton, 2002; Matthyssens et al., 2013; 
Peters et al., 2013; Ryan et al., 2012) and, to a lesser extent, structuration theory (Ellis & 
Mayer, 2001; Lee et al., 2012; Nicholson et al., 2013; Peters et al., 2009). 
 
However, most of the above work has focused primarily on theoretical pluralism. With a 
specific eye on methodological developments in industrial marketing, Nicholson et al. 
(2014) point out that there are actually three dimensions of pluralism: theoretical, 
methodological and methodical. The latter two have received much less attention than the 
first, with only occasional calls to recognize the value of drawing upon both quantitative 
and qualitative methods to address the same research problem (e.g. Levy & Kellstadt, 
2012; Tadajewski, 2008; Woodside & Baxter, 2013). The current paper focuses on 
methodological pluralism: the theory and practice of drawing upon methods from two or 
more different paradigmatic sources and using them together within a single study. 
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Since methodological pluralism is something that has only been called for relatively 
recently in marketing discourse, we believe that our understanding of it could be 
enhanced by reflections on mature debates in other disciplines. We focus in this paper on 
the line of reasoning that was stimulated by the seminal works of Jackson and Keys 
(1984), Jackson (1987a; 1987b; 1991) and Flood and Jackson (1991a; 1991b) in the 
disciplines of Systems Science and Operational Research (OR). This work has been 
largely neglected in Industrial Marketing scholarship. Within OR, methodological 
pluralism came to be called ‘multimethodology’ (Mingers & Gill, 1997), but it is 
essentially the same concept. Because of this disciplinary cross-over between Systems 
Science and Operational Research, we will refer to those engaged in the debate as the 
‘Systems/OR’ community. By the mid-1990s, well over 100 Systems/OR researchers had 
actively contributed through journal papers, books, chapters and conference presentations 
(Midgley, 1996a). Indeed the debate still continues, albeit with less intensity now, as the 
argument for methodological pluralism has basically been won. Nobody in Systems/OR 
now questions the utility of methodological pluralism, even if there are still some 
murmurings of discontent about different researchers' theoretical underpinnings: e.g. see 
Walker (2007) and Zhu (2011), who argue that the debate in Systems/OR has missed the 
opportunity to draw upon the American pragmatist tradition (e.g. Dewey, 1938; James, 
1904; Peirce, 1934; Singer, 1959) due to Jackson’s (1987b) early dismissal of 
pragmatism as atheoretical. He basically set up a degraded version of ‘pragmatism’ as a 
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straw man to pit methodological pluralism against (Midgley, 2000), and this seems to 
have been accepted by some other authors without question.  
 
Below, we draw extensively on the Systems/OR literature as we unfold our own 
perspective on how methodological pluralism should be conceived and what value can be 
derived from it. Our argument specifically responds to Woodside and Baxter (2013:382) 
who note that:  
“Because B2B decision researchers are likely to continue to use a broad 
range of theoretical bases, they will need a broader range of epistemologies 
and methodologies in future in order to investigate marketing phenomena.” 
 
Our concerns in this endeavor are similar to those of Tadajewski (2008), who looks at the 
politics of implementing and practicing paradigm commensurability; we focus on what 
philosophical, psychological and cultural challenges need to be addressed by industrial 
marketing scholars if methodological pluralism is to be both widely accepted and widely 
used.  
 
First, however, let us start with some basic questions: what exactly is methodological 
pluralism? And why is it useful? 
 
 
2.0: Two levels of pluralism and their value  
 
To answer the first question above, it is vital to understand the difference between 
‘method’ and ‘methodology’. While methodology refers to the theory that justifies the 
use of particular methods, a method is a set of techniques operated in a sequence to 
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achieve a given purpose (Checkland, 1981; Jackson, 2000; Midgley, 2000). When we talk 
of methodological pluralism, we mean embracing the possibility of engagement at two 
levels: at the level of methodology, where we can acknowledge others’ methodological 
ideas and thereby allow their insights to inform our own methodology (either temporarily, 
during a particular study, or on a longer-term basis as continual reference points); and 
also at the level of method, where we can use a wide range of methods in support of 
particular purposes.  
 
When a methodology is proscriptive, refusing validity or legitimacy to the majority of 
methods, it can be called ‘isolationist’ (Jackson, 1987b). Most methodologies produced 
during the 20th Century, whichever paradigms they had origins in, are isolationist: they 
prescribe what their creators believe is the ‘one best way’ of doing things (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979; Jackson, 1987b). In contrast, a pluralist can use the full range of available 
methods, but they are reinterpreted through the theoretical lens of a researcher’s own 
methodology.  
 
As there are different rationales for pluralism at the levels of methodology and method, 
they are dealt with separately below. 
 
 
2.1 The value of learning from other methodologies 
 
The essential value of being aware of, and learning from, a variety of methodological 
positions comes from the knowledge that no one theory, or set of theories − whether or 
 7  
 
 
not they have been codified into a methodology − can ever be comprehensive 
(Francescato, 1992; Midgley, 2011; Morgan, 1986; Romm, 1996). Therefore, it is bound 
to be the case that others will have different insights to us. While we may disagree with, 
and want to challenge, some of their assumptions, it may also be the case that one or 
more of their ideas could usefully be incorporated in a methodology of our own. The 
purpose of learning from other methodologies is therefore that reflections on the 
similarities with, and differences from, one’s own ideas can enable the continued 
evolution of one’s own methodology (Gregory, 1992; Romm, 1996). The key to this 
learning is to welcome the insights of others without taking on any idea to the exclusion 
of all others (Midgley, 2011). Therefore, to say that (for example) marketing research 
requires a certain set of experimental methods should not lead to the conclusion that only 
these methods are valid. Those aspects of scientific methodology that promote a 
worldview which invalidates other methods need to be opened to challenge, but an 
experimental method (and indeed any other method which may have originally been 
derived from a proscriptive/isolationist methodology) can still be seen through the lens of 
a pluralist methodology. Of course, this raises the thorny issue of the nature of learning 
across paradigm boundaries, and we will look more closely at different authors’ views on 
cross-paradigm learning later in the paper. 
 
2.2 The value of a plurality of methods 
 
The value of pluralism at the level of methods comes from observations of what happens 
if only a very narrow set of methods is used − indeed, it has been known for some people 
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to specialize in the use of just one. With an armory of just one or two methods, three 
significant, interlinked problems arise:  
 
First, in an applied research setting, the researcher may not be able to deal effectively 
with situations where the theoretical assumptions flowing into their favorite method are at 
odds with the assumptions being made by key stakeholders. This kind of situation can 
create significant stakeholder dissatisfaction. If this dissatisfaction is experienced by 
powerful decision makers, and the chosen method contradicts their assumptions without 
opening up a dialogue with them, then it is likely that the research will be ignored or even 
actively undermined. This point is alluded to by Tadajewski (2008:280) when he 
comments that “the politically powerful have greater opportunities to define the nature of 
intellectual discourse”.  
 
Underlying this claim is a critically important idea: no research method is neutral. Spash 
(1997) discusses this at length, giving the example of cost-benefit analysis applied to 
environmental issues. Methods of cost-benefit analysis, which involve stakeholders in 
making trade-offs between economic and environmental values, automatically 
marginalize environmentalists who cannot accept the utilitarian trade-off mentality 
embedded in the methods: many environmentalists take a deontological stance (also 
discussed by Hunt & Vitell, 1986), arguing that there are environmental imperatives that 
cannot legitimately be traded for benefits elsewhere. If isolationist marketing research 
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creates this kind of marginalization by using methods that contradict the thinking of less 
powerful stakeholders, then it can potentially do more harm than good. 
 
The second significant problem with using a narrow range of methods is that, as the 
research proceeds, the focal issues may change as people’s understanding develops. So 
what may have started out as, say, a focus group study on different aspects of consumer 
behavior may reveal an issue of gender stereotyping that really needs to be followed up 
through a quantitative study of the uses of different types of imagery in advertising. If the 
researcher can only use focus groups, then he or she will be unable to deal with this 
change in focus − unless the new issue can be forced into the mold of the old one (also 
see Levy & Kellstadt, 2012).  
 
The third problem associated with the use of a narrow range of methods is that 
researchers may see all issues through the methodological lens that these methods have 
traditionally been associated with. Therefore, it is not just that the use of a narrow range 
of methods makes the researcher unresponsive to both changing agendas and stakeholders 
who disagree with the assumptions flowing into the research, but also he or she is 
unlikely to be aware of this fact. This lack of insight, which comes from an unwillingness 
to explore the possibility that there may be other ways of seeing, is a substantial obstacle 
to developing a flexible and responsive research practice. The ability to mix methods 
drawn from a variety of methodological sources is necessary for such a practice.  
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When we talk about ‘mixing methods’, we should note that we mean more than just 
triangulation; exploring a given phenomenon from different angles using two or more 
complementary methods (Brewer and Hunter, 1989). While triangulation is a perfectly 
legitimate sub-category of mixing methods, it is relatively limited compared to the 
practice discussed by Midgley (1997a, 2000), who talks about defining an interrelated set 
of research purposes and creatively mixing methods in response. Indeed, it is not usually 
a matter of ‘stitching’ methods together in an additive fashion (although this can be 
done): a whole system (interrelated set) of purposes can be pursued through a synergy of 
different methods.  
 
The absence of a substantive and widespread practice of mixing methods may, at least in 
part, explain the persistence of the ‘relevance gap’ between academic marketing research 
and marketing practice. This relevance gap is a current area of concern in the field of 
business-to-business marketing and is confirmed by the publication in 2014 of a special 
issue of the Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing entitled “B2B research and 
managerial relevance” (Åge & Cederlund, 2014). What is clear from several of the 
articles in this special issue is that marketing scholars are concerned that academic 
marketing knowledge in the business-to-business field fails to contribute to practice 
(Brennan et al., 2014; Gummesson, 2014; Kuusela et al., 2014). Notably, Baraldi et al 
(2014) report on a content analysis of the managerial implications arising from prominent 
business-to-business marketing articles, and find little evidence that these are of value to 
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marketing practitioners. Mingers & Brocklesby (1997) argue that managers commonly 
practice pluralism, unlike most researchers who are wedded to more limited paradigms 
that disallow the mixing of diverse methods. We argue that the practice of mixing 
methods, and the philosophy of methodological pluralism that underpins this, marks a 
step towards achieving greater stakeholder relevance in industrial marketing research.  
 
3.0: Challenges to methodological pluralism 
 
While it should be clear from the above that substantial value can be gained from 
methodological pluralism, we nevertheless need to acknowledge that there are challenges 
to be overcome. In our view, these are not insurmountable, but need to be explicitly 
identified and addressed. In particular, doubts have been raised as to the cultural 
feasibility and intellectual credibility of methodological pluralism (Brocklesby, 1994, 
1997; Mingers & Brocklesby, 1996): for example, different methods have been conceived 
in different, arguably incommensurable paradigms. For instance, within industrial 
marketing, the American school of thought is largely associated with functionalist 
assumptions and quantitative approaches; the Scandinavian School of Relationship 
Marketing has been largely associated with interpretative, qualitative approaches; and the 
Industrial Marketing and Purchasing Group has likewise used interpretative, qualitative 
approaches, particularly the case study method (Hanson & Grimmer, 2007; Palmer et al., 
2005). Each of the paradigms makes fundamentally different assumptions about the 
nature of reality (ontology) and our knowledge of it (epistemology), so how then may we 
mix methods without philosophical muddle? The rest of this paper is designed to raise 
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these concerns and answer them by presenting a model of learning which industrial 
marketing researchers may use to further develop their understandings of methodology 
and methods over time. Here, we follow Mingers and Brocklesby (1996:111-112) in 
distinguishing between three challenges to the feasibility of methodological pluralism, 
portrayed in Figure 1. 
Methodological 
pluralism
Philosophical 
“Challenge”
Cultural 
“Challenge” 
Psychological 
“Challenge”
Paradigm 
incommensurability; 
seemingly 
insurmountable 
contradictions between 
the paradigms
The extent to which 
organizational and 
academic cultures 
militate against 
methodological 
pluralism
The problems of 
overcoming individual 
resistance to learning new 
methods 
 
 
Figure 1: A model of challenges to achieving methodological pluralism (Based on 
Mingers and Brocklesby, 1996, p.111-112). 
 
 
Each of these challenges will be discussed in turn, and then the arguments of various 
authors from both the Systems/OR and marketing disciplines will be reviewed. Finally, 
our own model of researcher learning will be presented, and we will argue that 
acceptance of this model addresses two of the three challenges, and offers a new 
understanding of methodology which will be particularly valuable to industrial marketing 
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scholars wishing to engage in methodological pluralism. The third challenge (the cultural 
one) will not be addressed by the model of learning − but then, we suggest that no 
methodology or model can create culture change except by demonstrating that it works in 
ways that others value. It will require empirical studies using multiple methods drawn 
from different paradigms, not just the model presented in this paper, to make this 
demonstration. So let us start by clarifying the nature of the philosophical challenge. 
 
3.1: The philosophical challenge 
 
At the level of philosophy we have to face the paradigm problem, which can be 
summarized as follows. All methodologies make different philosophical and theoretical 
assumptions − i.e., they are born in different paradigms − so if we wish to bring them 
together in a framework, or mix methods from them, we have to justify this at the level of 
philosophy. Some authors (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Jackson & Carter, 1991, 1993) 
claim that philosophical paradigms are irrevocably incommensurable. This might lead 
one to suppose that methodological pluralism is a non-starter. Others claim that rational 
analysis may bridge the paradigm gap, allowing for a ‘unification’ of paradigms (Davies 
& Fitchett, 2005; Gioia & Pitre, 1990; Han, 2000; Lowe et al., 2004; Reed, 1997) or that 
communication across paradigm boundaries is possible even if unification is neither 
feasible nor desirable (Gregory, 1992; Tadajewski, 2008; Willmott, 1993). Proponents of 
methodological pluralism claiming coherence must inevitably develop a position on the 
paradigm problem otherwise they risk being accused of theoretically contradictory 
eclecticism (a concern for Hunt, 1990, 1992, 1994, 2003). 
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3.2: The cultural challenge 
 
The cultural challenge has been described by Brocklesby and colleagues (Brocklesby, 
1994; Brocklesby & Cummings, 1995; Mingers & Brocklesby, 1996; Mingers, 1997), 
referring to the Management Science community and its attitude to ‘multimethodology’ 
(their name for methodological pluralism), as follows: 
 
 “The question....is whether the existing cultural constitution of the 
management science community will facilitate or act as a barrier against the 
widespread adoption of multimethodology as a research strategy. Obviously 
this depends on the size of the cultural gap between where we are now, and 
where − in relation to multimethodology − we would like to be (Mingers & 
Brocklesby, 1996:115).  
 
They make a point in relation to the Systems/OR community that has equal resonance for 
marketing researchers: that few of us are trained in sufficient depth to facilitate the fluent 
use of methods commonly associated with different paradigms. Brocklesby (1994:80) 
also offers 
“…doubts about the extent to which formal guidance for methodology 
choice is sufficient to nullify the influence of cultural factors that 
predispose individuals to favor particular methodologies”.  
 
Examples include the use of case study methods by IMP scholars (grounded in 
interpretive assumptions) and the use of survey methods by scholars in the American 
school (based on functionalist assumptions).  
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3.3: The psychological challenge 
 
Authors identifying psychological barriers to methodological pluralism include 
Brocklesby (1995, 1997) and Mingers and Brocklesby (1996). In his 1997 work, 
Brocklesby claims the following: 
 “It is one thing to say that there has been some degree of accommodation 
between the various.... paradigms because the combatants no longer 
completely ignore one another, or because it is now possible for “alternative” 
researchers to publish in dominant paradigm journals…but, for an individual 
agent, multimethodology [methodological pluralism] demands a form of 
accommodation that is altogether more daunting. Reorienting educational 
programmes with the intention of creating a new breed of.... scientist who can 
routinely traverse the boundaries of the various paradigms is, itself, a difficult 
enough proposition, but transforming someone who has been thoroughly 
socialised in a single paradigm and has years of investment in a particular 
approach is an even more ambitious project” (Brocklesby, 1997, p.190). 
 
Essentially, the challenge for industrial marketers is psychological resistance to 
methodological pluralism. 
 
Mingers and Brocklesby (1996:117) also ask whether individuals have “cognitive 
predilections” which predispose them to prefer one paradigm, and therefore one set of 
methods, over another: e.g., people may have a greater or lesser facility for mathematics 
(to support statistical analysis in quantitative research) and for advanced interpersonal 
skills (to support interviewing and focus group facilitation in qualitative research). If 
people have different personalities that affect their paradigm allegiances, then it will no 
doubt take a great effort for them to learn new methods outside the set that they feel 
comfortable with (Mingers & Brocklesby, 1996).  
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3.4: Proposed solutions 
 
Over the last 25 years, these problems have been addressed by a variety of authors in the 
Systems/OR community. By far the greatest focus has been on the philosophical 
challenge (the paradigm problem), primarily because this was identified well before the 
others. Marketing scholarship has also tended to focus on this. Over the coming pages we 
will review some of the main contributions to the debate. We will then present a new 
model of learning that we believe takes the debate one stage further. 
 
3.4.1: Meta-paradigmatic thinking 
 
To address the paradigm problem, Flood (1989, 1990), Jackson (1990, 1991, 1993) and 
Flood and Jackson (1991a, 1991b) draw upon Habermas’s (1972) theory of knowledge-
constitutive interests. In brief, this is the idea that, as a species, all human beings have a 
‘technical’ interest in work, a ‘practical’ interest in achieving mutual understanding, and 
an ‘emancipatory’ interest in freedom from oppressive power relationships. Flood and 
Jackson align three types of methodology with the three interests: quantitative, modelling 
methodologies are used to support the technical interest; qualitative, meaning-orientated 
methodologies are viewed as supporting the practical interest; and confrontational, 
boundary-challenging methodologies are seen as supporting the emancipatory interest.  
 
Flood (1990) says that this approach is ‘meta-paradigmatic’ − governing the use of other 
paradigms. Essentially, Flood and Jackson ‘solve’ the philosophical challenge by the use 
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of a meta-theory which guides the practical use of sub-paradigms. Their approach would 
seem to be similar in form to the arguments of several marketing scholars who propose 
meta-theoretical solutions (Hunt, 2013; Möller, 2013; Vargo & Lusch, 2004, 2008), even 
though their meta-theories are quite different to Flood and Jackson’s.  
 
However, in our view, there is a significant contradiction in this idea. Flood’s (1990) 
claim that his work is ‘meta-paradigmatic’ is undermined by the epistemological 
assumptions made in Habermas’s (1972) theory of knowledge-constitutive interests: that 
there are three inherent interests of the human species. These assumptions are alien to and 
incommensurate with assumptions made by the proponents of the various paradigms that 
Flood and Jackson try to contextualize: those paradigms have completely different 
epistemological foundations. Therefore, by accepting Habermas’s theory, Flood actually 
sets up new paradigmatic assumptions: he does not rise above the paradigm debate at all 
(see also Midgley, 1989a; 1989b, 1996a).  
 
We do not regard this ‘solution’ to the paradigm problem to be credible, and indeed both 
Flood and Jackson have now turned their backs on it too (Flood & Romm, 1996; Jackson, 
1999). It should also be noted that Flood and Jackson’s use of Habermas’s (1972) theory 
of knowledge-constitutive interests does not address the cultural and psychological 
problems. Therefore, we suggest that it is appropriate to abandon this line of argument. 
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3.4.2: Towards a new paradigm  
 
When Flood and Jackson first proposed this meta-paradigmatic thinking, Midgley 
(1989a) saw the above problem and wrote a critique of their position. He has consistently 
argued that it is impossible for any approach to methodological pluralism to be meta-
paradigmatic. Far from being meta-paradigmatic, we suggest that those engaging with 
methodological pluralism are trying instead to establish the foundations for a new 
paradigm (Midgley, 1989a, 1989b, 1990, 1992, 1996a, 1997b, 2000, 2016; Nicholson et 
al., 2014). Of course, pluralists can still learn from other paradigms (Gregory, 1992), but 
this learning is always geared to the enhancement of one’s own paradigmatic position − 
there is no pretense that other people’s methodological ideas are used in exactly the 
manner that their creators intended. 
 
Midgley (1992) put forward a different pluralist theory. Rather than follow Flood and 
Jackson’s (1991a,b) use of Habermas’s (1972) epistemology, he recognized that different 
ways of knowing (facets of epistemology) may well reflect different aspects of the world 
(facets of ontology). He argued that our ontological perspective must be multi-faceted to 
support methodological pluralism, as different methods ultimately need to be aligned 
with different ontological categories. He therefore offered a theory of ‘four domains of 
complexity’ (Midgley, 1992, 1996b, 2001, 2016). The four domains are: 
1. ‘Natural world’ complexity; or the complexity of ‘what is’. The ideal of inquiry 
into this form of complexity is truth – but note the term ‘ideal’ which, following 
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Popper (1959, 1972), indicates that truth is something we aim for, but we can 
never know for certain whether it has been achieved. 
2. ‘Social world’ complexity, or the complexity of ‘what ought to be’ in relation to 
actual or potential action. The ideal of inquiry into this form of complexity is 
rightness. 
3. ‘Subjective world’ complexity; or the complexity of what any individual (the self 
or another) is thinking, intending or feeling. The ideal of inquiry into this form of 
complexity can be called understanding subjectivity. 
4. We very often have to deal with interactions between phenomena in the above 
three domains of complexity. This means that there is also the complexity of these 
interactions, which needs to be a focus of inquiry.  
Midgley (1992) then went on to propose that ‘hard’ systems methods (mostly quantitative 
modeling methods from the positivist and neo-positivist traditions) are useful for 
understanding the natural world, because they are essentially truth-seeking; ‘soft’ systems 
methods (mostly qualitative dialogue methods from the interpretative and 
phenomenological traditions) are useful for social world complexity, because they 
explore subjective and inter-subjective views on what ought to be done in a given 
context, so are clearly orientated to normative inquiry (here, methods in Systems/OR are 
a little different to the interpretative tradition in marketing, which is less concerned with 
the normative); and he pointed out that there are very few methods in the systems 
sciences to support the exploration of subjective worlds (he suggested importing some 
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from disciplines like Psychology and Psychoanalysis). Most importantly, Midgley (1992, 
2016) claimed that exploring the interactions between the above three types of 
complexity (i.e. dealing with the fourth form of complexity) is fundamentally important 
in the construction of any research project, given that most complex phenomena need to 
be seen as multi-faceted, and exploring the interactions between the different forms of 
complexity justifies and underpins the construction of mixed method research designs. 
 
Note, however, that Midgley (1992) does not portray his approach as meta-paradigmatic. 
Rather, he proposes a new pluralist paradigm, with explicit ontological and 
epistemological assumptions. For other, more recent texts exploring the connections 
between pluralism at the levels of methods, methodology, epistemology and ontology, 
see Esbjörn-Hargens and Zimmerman (2009), Edwards (2010), Esbjörn-Hargens (2010) 
and Du Plessis (2014).  
 
It is because we do not believe that paradigmatic thinking can be transcended that we 
stress the mixing of methods, not methodologies. We argue that we can learn from other 
methodologies to aid the on-going construction of our own, and we can detach methods 
from their original methodological principles in order to use them in new ways. This is 
now a widely accepted way of thinking about methodological pluralism in the 
Systems/OR community (e.g. Brocklesby, 1997; Flood, 1995a, 1995b; Flood & Romm, 
 21  
 
 
1996; Gregory, 1992, 1996a, 1996b; Midgley, 1992, 1997b, 2000; Mingers, 1997; 
Munlo, 1997; Yolles, 1996, 1999).  
 
This argument addresses the paradigm problem: there is no need to claim that we are 
operating across paradigms − we just have to acknowledge that we are setting up a new 
position which encourages learning about ideas from other paradigms, but reinterpreted 
in our own terms. However, it does not explicitly address the cultural or psychological 
challenges because its production pre-dated their identification. Nevertheless, Brocklesby 
(1997) builds his own argument that psychological barriers can be overcome using 
Midgley's approach.  
 
Brocklesby (1997) argues that the psychological barrier to multi-paradigm thinking exists 
because of the demands of moving between fundamentally different sets of assumptions. 
It is difficult enough, when wedded to one paradigm, to accept the possibility that another 
one has anything valid to offer − but moving freely between two or more paradigms, 
changing one’s assumptions as one goes, is considerably harder. For example, at one 
moment it requires a person to believe that there is a real world that he or she can know, 
and at the next moment he or she may need to deny this ‘basic fact’ altogether. This is 
simply contradictory. However, it is entirely different to say that we can develop a ‘new’ 
set of paradigmatic assumptions that embraces the best of several old sets. Brocklesby 
(1997:211) proposes that: 
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“Whereas multi-paradigm multimethodology would have an agent move from 
one paradigm to another depending on which methodology, or part thereof is 
being used at any moment, an alternative possibility has methodologies 
originating in different paradigms being employed in the service of a new 
paradigm.… This option.... provides the authority to throw away the old rule 
books and play by new rules. The new rules circumvent the need to be 
constantly adjusting one’s philosophical position depending upon which 
methodology or technique is being used at any moment in time, which, as we 
have seen, can create difficulties”.  
 
 
3.4.3: Paradigm (in)commensurability 
 
Flood and Romm (1995, 1996) acknowledge the argument advanced by Midgley and 
others − that any attempt to embrace methodological pluralism will require the intervener 
to make assumptions that other methodologists may not agree with. It is therefore very 
difficult to suggest that there is genuine commensurability between paradigms: there is no 
position outside the paradigm debate from which to achieve this commensurability. 
Nevertheless, they insist that it is still possible to contextualize other ways of thinking 
from a pluralist perspective. People may thereby choose the most appropriate approach to 
each research project, depending on perceptions of the circumstances and the wishes of 
the researcher(s) and other agents involved. Because Flood and Romm (1995) see both 
the paradigmatic nature of pluralistic practice and the possibility of contextualizing ideas 
from other paradigms, they refuse to talk about either paradigm commensurability or 
incommensurability. Instead, they express the irony of the problem with the phrase 
“paradigm (in)commensurability” (note the ‘in’ is bracketed). 
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Our own view is that resorting to a phrase like “paradigm (in)commensurability” 
expresses the irony of the paradigm problem very well, but it does not take us any further 
in dealing with the three challenges that provide the focus for this paper (Figure 1). It 
merely indicates the bluntness of the language of paradigms in helping us deal with the 
relationships between our own ideas and the ideas of others. Let us explain.  
 
When Kuhn (1962) first popularised the term ‘paradigm’, his insights were revelatory for 
many philosophers of science: previously, science had been seen as an activity that 
allowed incremental progress by continually developing our store of knowledge. 
However, this older view did not take account of the experiences of scientists who often 
found themselves involved in lengthy theoretical debates with others. People trying to 
introduce new thinking encountered great resistance: old ideas were often defended by 
their advocates for many years. When Kuhn suggested that different groups of scientists 
make different paradigmatic assumptions, and that one view eventually ‘replaces’ the 
other, this seemed to explain the difficulties people experienced in convincing others of 
their point of view. We suggest that the language of paradigms has been very important 
because of the light it has thrown on how scientific communities function.  
 
Nevertheless, the first indications of its bluntness were identified quite early on. For 
instance, Masterman (1970) points out that Kuhn uses the term ‘paradigm’ in a large 
number of different ways—Kuhn cannot cover every angle without doing so. While the 
language of paradigms has certainly generated insights, we wish to argue that its 
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inadequacies become transparent when we think about individual learning. For paradigms 
to change, it must be possible for individual agents to propose new ideas that step outside 
old paradigmatic assumptions. The question is: what kind of ‘paradigm’ is operational 
when an individual initially breaks the paradigmatic mold? What about the maverick who 
uses tools that are not associated with an existing paradigm? And, in the context of 
methodological pluralism, what is the status of the work of an individual who proposes a 
position which draws on ideas from other paradigms? Tsoukas (1993) claims that an 
individual cannot give birth to a paradigm: a paradigm is only born when the individual’s 
ideas have become widely accepted. What then is the relationship between paradigms and 
the thinking of individuals? Gregory (1992) and Yolles (1999, 1996) have both addressed 
these questions, so their work is discussed next. 
 
3.4.4: Critically appreciating alien paradigms 
 
Like Midgley (1989a), Gregory (1992) insists that it is impossible to transcend the 
paradigm debate: each attempt to do so must inevitably involve researchers in making 
new paradigmatic assumptions. However, she advances our thinking by examining the 
nature of communication between people based in different paradigms. Every time one 
person listens to another whose thinking is based in another paradigm, he or she can only 
interpret what they are saying through his or her own terms of reference. However, this 
does not mean communication is impossible − just that care is needed not to be either 
dismissive or to think that full understanding has been achieved. Tadajewski (2008) 
similarly acknowledges that a person from one paradigm can appreciate another speaking 
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in a different ‘paradigmatic dialect’. This way of thinking advances the debate because it 
allows us to see paradigms in relation to the perspectives of individual researchers. 
Learning through the appreciation of others’ viewpoints can feed back, via 
communication, to transform one’s own paradigm. Brocklesby (1997) further notes that 
when one moves from a paradigm of origin to another and back again, on return a 
researcher is likely to behave differently than they did before first stepping out of their 
isolationist paradigm.  
 
Gregory’s (1992) approach not only deals with the paradigm problem, it also addresses 
the problem of psychological resistance to methodological pluralism. This is because the 
primary emphasis is on learning: for the researcher to start learning, there is no need for 
him or her to have full knowledge of a multitude of methods and methodologies. There is 
only a need for a critical attitude: a preparedness to listen to others when we encounter 
them, and a willingness to research new approaches. Of course, there can be no 
absolutely objective need for new approaches, but processes of self-reflection, dialogue 
with others, observation of circumstances, and ideology critique can help to highlight the 
limitations of one’s current armory of methods.  
 
3.4.5: Virtual paradigms 
 
Yolles (1999, 1996) also addresses the paradigm problem by shifting the focus to the 
level of the individual researcher. He argues that, while paradigms are formalized sets of 
shared assumptions held in common by groups (not just research communities, but also 
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organizations), individual agents can establish ‘virtual’ paradigms: that is, they can work 
out a set of assumptions through which ‘reality’ and ideas (including methods and 
methodologies) from other paradigms can be interpreted. A virtual paradigm may be 
temporary (like a working hypothesis or model), or it may be developed over the longer 
term. A virtual paradigm may also become a true paradigm if others begin to share the 
assumptions: when it comes to be shared right across an organization or community, the 
paradigm’s transition from ‘virtual’ to ‘true’ status can be said to be complete. Yolles 
(1996) puts it like this: 
 “....if paradigms are to be compared and coordinated.... [this can only be 
done] through the creation of a virtual paradigm because (1) without a 
paradigm, nothing can be said about reality, and (2) new language shows that 
a new paradigm has been created.... Its creation is dependent on the modeller, 
to whom it is totally relative. Different modellers may define different virtual 
paradigms, and classify situations in a modelling space according to the 
paradigm that they choose through which to see. In due course, however, if it 
becomes accepted by a group and if norms develop that modellers use in 
order to classify situations, then the paradigm loses its status as virtual” 
(Yolles, 1996:568-569, emphasis in the original). 
 
In our view, Yolles has dealt with the paradigm problem in a useful and interesting 
manner, building on the observation that any vision of pluralism must be paradigmatic. 
Indeed, Yolles’s idea of a virtual paradigm helps us escape from Tsoukas’s (1993) 
criticism of Midgley's writing on the paradigm issue: Tsoukas argues that an individual or 
small group cannot claim to set up a new paradigm − it is always a large group or 
community phenomenon (apparently leaving no room for a maverick to do something 
different). However, using Yolles’s language, an individual or small group can claim to 
establish a virtual paradigm. For instance, through an analysis of the literature, it would 
 27  
 
 
be possible to trace the development of the IMP tradition from ‘virtual’ to ‘true’ status, as 
more and more people embraced it.  
 
Unlike the paradigm problem, Yolles does not explicitly address the psychological and 
cultural challenges. We surmise that Yolles would have the same answer as Gregory 
(1992) to the psychological challenge: that on-going learning about methodology and 
methods at the individual level, via the establishment of virtual paradigms, is a means to 
overcome the psychological barriers to methodological pluralism that are partly the result 
of an unrealistic expectation that researchers should come into the world ready-equipped 
with a full armory of methods.  
 
However, perhaps Yolles’s thinking is most relevant in relation to the cultural challenge. 
While Gregory and Midgley have not addressed this at all, and Mingers and Brocklesby 
(1996) talk in very general terms about changing the education of future generations of 
academics, Yolles at least clarifies the mechanism through which cultural change towards 
a more pluralist practice might come about: the establishment of a virtual paradigm that 
begins to gain wide-spread support, until it becomes a fully-fledged paradigm in its own 
right which others can commit themselves to. Indeed, it is quite possible to have a variety 
of pluralist paradigms which people can choose between: as Mingers and Brocklesby 
(1996), Midgley (1997b), Mingers (1997), Mingers and Gill (1997) and Nicholson et al 
(2014) show, there are a number of virtual paradigms out there which have the potential 
to grow into something more. 
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4.0: A proposal for a model of learning 
 
Having reviewed some of the writings that have addressed the three challenges facing 
methodological pluralism, we can now move on to present the model of learning that we 
argue can offer a new methodological understanding. We intend to construct the model in 
a series of stages, adding greater complexity at each stage. When complete, we will 
reflect back on the three challenges and discuss how the model does (or does not) address 
them.  
 
We should note that this model represents an ideal learning practice that can be used for 
critical reflection at any level of agency: individual researchers can work towards this 
pattern of learning for themselves, as can small groups and whole communities of 
researchers. In writing the text below, we have tended to use language associated with 
individual learning, but it would only take a minor linguistic adjustment to argue the case 
for group and/or community learning too. We should also be clear that, when we say that 
this is an ideal learning practice, we mean that it is a model of good practice to aim 
towards, not one to be operationalized all in one go. It would be unrealistic to specify a 
minimum set of skills to start pluralist practice in industrial marketing research (as 
Mingers and Brocklesby, 1996, argue, most of us are products of education systems that 
limit the scope of skills development), but we do need to be willing to learn as we go.  
 
Let us start by reflecting back on the relationship between a pluralist methodology and 
isolationist methodologies, as discussed in Section 2. A pluralist methodology can have a 
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wide range of methods associated with it, some of which may have been drawn from 
isolationist approaches, but their use comes to be seen through the lens of the pluralist 
methodology. Learning about the existence of different methods, and their possible 
strengths and weaknesses, needs to be an on-going process: one can start with just a 
couple of methods and proceed from there.  
 
4.1: Continuity and discontinuity 
 
Let us now look at how learning about methodologies and methods comes about. We can 
see a pluralist methodology as a virtual paradigm: essentially it is associated with the 
activities of an agent (whether an individual researcher or a group). If the agent is a 
relatively large group, constituting a research community, one could say that the 
paradigm is ‘true’, not ‘virtual’ − but here we will continue to refer to it as a virtual 
paradigm, if only not to be presumptuous. Because learning is an on-going process, the 
armory of methods will grow and develop as the agent becomes more and more 
experienced at pluralist marketing research. This is a relatively straight-forward kind of 
skills acquisition. 
 
However, learning also takes place at the level of methodology as well as methods. An 
important assumption we make is that a pluralist methodology is dynamic, not static. If it 
is possible to learn from others, then it is necessary for a methodology to evolve. 
Therefore, we must oppose the usual practice in academia of building a ‘crenellated’ 
paradigm (Cova et al 2015; Nicholson et al, 2014) and then defending it like a castle 
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against enemies. People with this kind of attitude see the modification of a methodology 
as a sign of weakness (Burrell, 1999). We view it as a strength, as long as learning is part 
of a process of construction in which ideas change in relation to both practical problems, 
dialogue with others, and theoretical reflection. Building a methodology is more like 
constructing a house, where extensions can be added, internal walls demolished, rooms 
redecorated, etc., to enhance both its function and the experience of living in it. This is 
different from the uninformed vacillation of someone who is so unsure of what they 
believe that every new idea is swallowed wholesale (perhaps what Hunt, 1994, refers to 
as ‘mindless pluralism’). Constructing a methodology is a much more considered process, 
but is still essentially dynamic. 
 
Importantly, if the methodology (virtual paradigm) changes on an on-going basis, there 
are always going to be tensions and discontinuities between different aspects of it that 
have been introduced at different times under different circumstances. In this sense, the 
methodology can be described as a ‘fragmentary whole’ (a deliberately paradoxical 
concept). It is the task of the agent, as part of his/her/their on-going learning, to balance 
two potentially contradictory activities: maintaining coherence and introducing new 
ideas. If there is too much emphasis on listening to new ideas, and these are not brought 
into a coherent perspective, then there will be no methodology to speak of − just a 
fragmentary set of theories, principles and rules for research practice. The result will be 
projects which jump from one impulse to another in a seemingly haphazard manner. 
Certainly, the researcher who falls prey to fragmentation is likely to be influenced by all 
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the new fads that come along, regardless of their worth (Jackson, 1995). In addition, he or 
she will not have a consistent language to communicate insights to others, so learning is 
unlikely to be passed from one generation to another (Jackson, 1987b). Finally, the agent 
who contradicts him or herself on a regular basis, without a coherent story to explain the 
contradictions, will lose credibility in the eyes of others, and may experience an 
unpleasant feeling of dissonance. 
 
Conversely if, in the interests of internal coherence, an agent closes off to influences from 
ideas other than his/her/their own, learning at the methodological level will be minimal at 
best. The likely outcome will be an impoverished methodology (virtual paradigm) which 
is self-justifying: if practice is always interpreted through the same methodological idea, 
then evidence that the methodology is impoverished will simply not be seen by the agent 
− research practice needs to be interpreted through more than one methodological idea for 
potential problems to be surfaced effectively (Romm, 1996). Of course, an impoverished, 
self-justifying virtual paradigm is unlikely to be seen as useful by others, so will not 
become widely shared.  
 
Maintaining the ‘right’ balance between coherence and openness to new ideas is like 
learning to ride a bicycle: one starts by regularly falling off, but fairly quickly the 
knowledge of how to make on-going adjustments in the contexts of practice and dialogue 
with one's peers becomes tacit, and riding becomes smooth and straight-forward.  
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4.2: Philosophical reflections 
 
Having clarified what it means for a pluralist methodology to be a ‘fragmentary whole’, 
we can now add the next layer of complexity into the model: reflections on philosophy. 
Midgley (2000) explicitly argues the case for the relevance of philosophy to 
methodology. The development of a philosophical position very much mirrors the 
development of a methodological one: a philosophical position can be a fragmentary 
whole which can take in and interpret ideas from other peoples’ philosophies.  
 
Fundamentally, the reason for exploring philosophy (from a methodological point of 
view) is to ask penetrating questions about the assumptions that methodologies make—
about their connections with other (in this case philosophical) discourses that flow 
through and influence the design, selection and use of methods. Again, we return to the 
work of Spash (1997) for a good example: by exposing the utilitarian philosophy implicit 
in supposedly ‘neutral’ cost-benefit analyses, Spash demonstrates their hidden bias in 
favor of economic exploitation and against environmental conservation. 
 
4.3: Reflections on practice 
 
The next layer of complexity comes from reflections upon marketing research practice. It 
seems to us to be pointless to explore methodology for its own sake: methodology only 
has meaning in relation to the projects in which it is applied (also see Midgley, 2000). 
The actual feedback from practice to methodology happens when the agent reflects on 
 33  
 
 
experiences of application. Explicit evaluations of methodologies and methods in the 
context of practice can also enhance this reflection (Midgley et al, 2013; White, 2006). 
 
Earlier, we mentioned Romm’s (1996) argument that reflections on practice need to be 
undertaken using multiple methodological positions, otherwise evidence of problems 
might not be revealed. This is important if one’s methodology is not to become self-
justifying, and it is part of learning from other methodological positions: to ask how other 
methodologists might evaluate one’s practice, and then to question whether they have a 
point that should be taken on board in terms of one’s own methodological development, 
the selection/design of methods, and/or future practice.  
 
4.4 Espoused methodology and methodology in use 
 
Brocklesby (1997) notes that members of paradigmatic research communities need to 
become explicitly conscious of being in a paradigm to even begin the transition to a 
pluralist perspective. Within the marketing discourse, Easton (1995:411) similarly notes 
that: “…what is often obscure is the fact that assumptions have been made and values 
smuggled into the decisions without the decision maker being aware of the process”. 
Vargo and Lusch (2004:2) further argue that “…a worldview or dominant logic is never 
clearly stated but more or less seeps into the individual and collective mind-set of 
scientists in a discipline”. Paradigmatic assumptions that are “smuggled” in, “seep” in or 
are not “clearly stated” may limit the scope of methodological pluralism, even if the 
researcher wants to embrace it.  
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Therefore, the final layer of complexity enters the picture when we consider how we 
might frame critical reflection on practice to counter the unthinking acceptance of ideas 
that only validate or legitimate a narrow range of methods, even when the researcher says 
they are a pluralist. Argyris (1985), Argyris and Schön (1974) and Schön (1983) make a 
very useful distinction between espoused theory and theory in use, which we want to 
adapt for inclusion in our model of learning. ‘Espoused theory’ is what an agent says they 
use by way of theory, methodology, principles, etc., and ‘theory in use’ is what they 
actually use, inferred from stakeholders' observations. Argyris and Schön suggest that the 
gap between ‘espoused theory’ and ‘theory in use’ can sometimes be quite wide, and the 
agent is almost always unaware of this fact. This is because theories in use tend to be 
“smuggled” in, while espoused theories are the subject of conscious reflection. Indeed, if 
people try to ‘force’ agents to see that their words and deeds are contradictory, they are 
likely to resist the insight. Therefore, Argyris and Schön say that agents need support to 
explore the gap between espoused theory and theory in use − and this support should take 
the form of facilitated dialogue forums and space for self-reflection. In essence, theories 
in use need to be brought into consciousness to be subjected to the same scrutiny as 
espoused theory.  
 
Because we find the word ‘theory’ to be too specific, here we adapt Argyris and Schön’s 
concepts. For the purposes of this discussion, we are interested in methodology and 
methods. Therefore, we prefer to talk about the evaluation of espoused methodology, 
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meaning evaluation against stakeholders’ and others' interpretations of methodology in 
use. The explicit evaluation of methodology, especially involving research participants in 
reflections on projects, is very important: there is simply no other way to assess whether a 
researcher's claims about the use of particular methodological principles stand up 
(Midgley et al., 2013; White, 2006).  
 
 
 
5.0: Concluding reflections on the three challenges 
 
Earlier, we said that we have presented this model as our response to the three challenges 
to methodological pluralism. Below, as the final act in our paper, we will show how the 
model addresses these challenges. 
 
5.1: Addressing the paradigm problem 
 
Our answer to the paradigm problem was clarified quite early on: we do not believe that 
it is possible to be ‘meta-paradigmatic’, unlike some other marketing scholars (Hunt, 
2013; Möller, 2013; Vargo & Lusch, 2004, 2008). Methodological pluralism involves us 
in setting up a new position which encourages learning about ideas from other paradigms, 
but reinterpreted in our own terms. This is an argument advocated previously by 
Nicholson et al. (2014), and it is also arguably in line with ideas advanced by Tadajewski 
(2004, 2008, 2009, 2010). The new position reinterpreting ideas from other paradigms 
can be seen as a ‘virtual’ paradigm (Yolles, 1996), owned by an individual or small group 
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− or, if it is shared sufficiently widely, it could be called a paradigm in its more 
traditional sense.  
 
5.2: Minimizing the psychological problem 
 
Our answer to the psychological problem of resistance to methodological pluralism, 
which occurs largely because of the wide span of knowledge it appears to require from a 
marketing researcher, is to emphasize learning over time, starting from the knowledge 
base the researcher has at the point at which he or she realizes the value of mixing 
methods. If this knowledge base consists of no more than one or two ideas from a single 
paradigm, then that’s a start − the researcher can reach out and begin learning from there. 
Even learning about an appropriate model of learning can be undertaken over time − but 
hopefully the model we have presented in this paper (and others in the literature) will be 
helpful in this regard, as will more general writings on methodology.  
 
5.3 Dealing with the cultural problem 
 
The one challenge that the model in this paper does not address is the cultural problem. 
Mingers and Brocklesby (1996) express doubts about whether the culture is right 
amongst academics for more than a minority to accept methodological pluralism. They 
talk about the need to establish new kinds of education programs to promote this kind of 
thinking. However, the bottom line in terms of cultural acceptance is whether or not 
methodological pluralism is perceived as adding value to people’s current marketing 
research practices. We are personally convinced of this added value, especially if there is 
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no expectation that marketing researchers should enter the world with a widely informed, 
ready-made set of methods. These can be picked up through an on-going process of 
learning. What is therefore needed is an extended body of evidence in industrial 
marketing for the value (or otherwise) of methodological pluralism, and we look forward 
to contributing to its development.  
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